# March 2026 AMI Incident

ESB Networks Retail Market Services

(Presented at September 2026 IGG Meeting)

# March 2026 AMI Incident

- These slides provide a consolidated overview of the March 2026 AMI incident, including the background, response and recovery, as well as lessons learned and resilience actions identified following Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and process review.
- This content summarises and builds on the information previously shared through IGG meetings, Market Participant engagement and email communications, and reflects the collaborative input of Market Participants throughout the daily incident calls and recent lessons-learned sessions.
- All previous IGG updates can be found on the RMDS website. Email updates were issued by RMDS to the nominated IGG representatives on behalf of ESB Networks.

# March AMI Incident Summary

**Incident Background:** As part of a planned AMI System upgrade that took place over the weekend of 6th - 8th March 2026, a defect was introduced which resulted in inflated Half Hourly (HH) Interval data being processed for a subset of MPRNs (RM107, RM108, RM305 and RM306).

**Defect Summary:** When Half Hourly Interval data from smart meters is processed, it is converted from Watts to kW by multiplying the values received from the meter by 0.001. The defect introduced meant that this multiplication did not happen for a subset of MCC12 MPRNs, and the Watt values were issued to Market Participants as kWs.

## Primary Impacts:

- Inflated MCC12 HH interval import data for a subset of impacted MPRNs was issued to the retail market on 8th March and included in the aggregated dataset for wholesale market settlement.
- A small volume of historic data was also impacted for meters with intermittent GSM coverage which connected and sent data during the weekend of the incident.
- Deemed microgeneration data was issued for a subset of impacted MPRNs.
- Inflated HH interval data was uploaded and visible on the ESB Networks Online Account for all impacted MPRNs.
- A higher than usual number of (valid) estimated periodic reads were issued for a subset of non-interval sites. There was no wholesale market settlement impact for these sites.
- Remote de-energisations and re-energisations were paused while recovery progressed.

## ESB Networks Recovery:

- The defect was identified and corrected on Monday 9th March.
- The majority (98.5%) of inflated Half Hourly Interval billing data was corrected by the evening of the 11th March; however the inaccuracies present in the remaining 1.5% required further manual corrections to facilitate wholesale market ad-hoc resettlement on 18th March.
- All remaining billing data was fully remediated from an ESB Networks perspective as of 25th March.
- The ESB Networks Online Account was restored with corrected data on 2nd April.
- All replacement microgeneration data was issued by 7th April
- Remote de-energisation requests for vacant premise were resumed on 18th March and for Smart PAYG on 23rd March in consultation with Market Participants.
- The incident was formally closed by ESB Networks on 10th April.

# Market Participant Engagement

Various communication channels were put in place during the incident.

<u>Between 9th March and 10th April</u>:

- Twice daily update emails via RMDS
- Market Participant 1:1s with ESB Networks as required
- Comms & Engagement Calls
- Daily Operational Briefing Calls
- Query management process established and briefed for Supplier incident queries
- Supplier Billing and ESB Networks Meter Reading team calls
- Email escalation process established for Supplier billing queries or concerns
- Messaging on the ESB Networks website




## <u>Post-Incident Bilateral Meetings with ESB Networks</u>

- Bilateral meetings with ESB Networks were offered to Market Participants. Seven Market Participants took up this offer and engagement took place across the June/July period.
- ESB Networks sought feedback and perspective from Market Participants in relation to impacts of the incident, as well as the response to and recovery from the incident (both what worked well and areas for improvement) to ensure the appropriate processes are in place at an industry level from the outset should any incident with similar data impacts occur in the future.

# Subsequent Investigation: Root Cause Analysis (RCA)

## Root Cause

- Following resolution of the incident on 9th March, ESB Networks carried out prompt investigation into the root cause and identification of associated lessons learned.
- This RCA investigation took the form of a full review of processes and release documentation, internal workshops with delivery and operational teams, and extensive engagement with the relevant vendor.
- The technical root cause was identified as a superseded configuration file inadvertently included in the upgrade release, which resulted in the defect.

## Corrective Actions

- The following corrective actions will be implemented by ESB Networks in Q3-2026. These actions will be complete in advance of the planned Q4 - 2026 AMI upgrade and release:
  - Additional release management controls will be added to the existing suite of checks for future releases.
  - Vendor management processes and ways of working will be further enhanced.
- The Q4 - 2026 AMI release will also include the introduction of a validation to identify spikes in half-hourly interval values.
- The following additional controls are already in place:
  - During issue resolution ESB Networks implemented daily checks in the Central Market System to identify and correct abnormally high HH Interval data values. These checks will remain in place.
  - For NQH sites, ESB Networks have recently implemented a check to detect abnormally high Actual Usage Factors(AUFs), ensuring they are corrected before inclusion in data aggregation.

# Subsequent Investigation: Response and Recovery

- Following completion of the RCA, ESB Networks carried out a structured review of its response to and recovery from the incident, with the purpose of defining practical improvements to organisational and industry-wide resilience in the event of any similar future data incidents.
- This review was focused on how the incident was managed and recovered, and how end-to-end continuity can be strengthened as the retail electricity market becomes increasingly dependent on timely, accurate smart meter data.
- The following inputs were considered in this review:
  - Structured internal lessons learned sessions focused on incident response controls and processes, timelines, communications and decisions.
  - Bilateral lessons learned sessions with Market Participants and SEMO.
  - Relevant findings from ESB Networks Root Cause Analysis.
  - A targeted review of peer utilities was undertaken to test the proposed response, recovery and resilience improvements against comparable industry practices.

# Response and Recovery Improvement Actions

The following improvement actions were identified during the review and will be progressed by ESB Networks:

**1. Internal Incident Runbook**

ESB Networks will develop an internal incident “runbook” for smart meter data validation incident response. This will include the development of a continuity process for the provision of an alternative dataset to SEMO if required on D+4 for settlement. The ESB Networks runbook will be implemented by Q4-2026.

**2. Industry Incident Runbook**

ESB Networks will develop an industry runbook for smart meter data validation incident response. ESB Networks will consult with RMDS in the development of the industry runbook and bring to the Industry Governance Group (IGG) for discussion with Market Participants in Q1-2027.

**3. AMI Resilience Review**

ESB Networks are currently undertaking an assessment of overall AMI solution resilience. This assessment will include an investigation of alternative data recovery capabilities and processes to ensure timely and effective resolution of future data issues. This assessment is planned to be completed by Q4-2026.

As well as the actions outlined, ESB Networks will commence investigation into the following:

- Additional validation of HH interval data for implausible consumption values.
- The withdrawal of erroneous HH Interval data in the event of any future incident involving large data volumes.

Any future developments will follow the agreed market change control process as required.

# Key Conclusions

- The March AMI incident was caused by a software upgrade issue and was not related to the integrity of smart meters themselves or the way they record energy use.
- ESB Networks recognises the impact on Market Participants and customers and values the strong collaboration and engagement that supported the recovery effort and successful provision of corrected billing data.
- ESB Networks remains responsible for the quality and timely provision of market data within its remit. End-to-end retail market resilience depends on coordinated arrangements across interconnected organisations, systems and governance processes. ESB Networks will therefore continue to engage with Market Participants, SEMO, RMDS and the CRU on appropriate industry-wide resilience arrangements.